Post-disaster social recovery: disaster governance lessons learnt from Tropical Cyclone Yasi by Serrao-Neumann, Silvia et al.
  
Silvia Serrao-Neumann, Florence Crick and Darryl C. Low 
Choy 
Post-disaster social recovery: disaster 
governance lessons learnt from Tropical 
Cyclone Yasi 
 






Serrao-Neumann, Silvia and Crick, Florence and Low Choy, Darryl C. (2018) Post-disaster 
social recovery: disaster governance lessons learnt from Tropical Cyclone Yasi. Natural 
Hazards. ISSN 0921-030X (In Press) 
 
© 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88345/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: June 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 






Title: Post-disaster social recovery: disaster governance lessons learnt from 
Tropical Cyclone Yasi  
Authors:  
Silvia Serrao-Neumann, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The University of 
Waikato, New Zealand; Cities Research Institute, Griffith University, Brisbane, 
Australia 
Florence Crick, London School of Economics and Political Science, Grantham 
Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London, United Kingdom 




Post-disaster social recovery remains the least understood of the disaster phases 
despite increased risks of extreme events leading to disasters due to climate change. 
This paper contributes to advance this knowledge by focusing on the disaster recovery 
process of the Australian coastal town of Cardwell which was affected by category 4/5 
tropical cyclone Yasi in 2011. Drawing on empirical data collected through semi-
structured interviews with Cardwell residents post Yasi, it examines issues related to 
social recovery in the first year of the disaster and two years later. Key findings discuss 
the role played by community members, volunteers and state actors in Cardwell’s 
post-disaster social recovery, especially with respect to how current disaster risk 
management trends based on self-reliance and shared responsibility unfolded in the 
recovery phase. Lessons learnt concerning disaster recovery governance are then 
extracted to inform policy implementation for disaster risk management to support 
social recovery and enhance disaster resilience in light of climate change. 
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1. Introduction  
The risk of climate-related disasters and the economic losses arising from these has 
been increasing across the world in the last few decades and will continue to do so as 
a result of climate change and socio-economic development (IPCC, 2012). In the last 
20 years, economic losses caused by all types of disasters across the world have 
amounted to around $2 trillion, with 64% of economic losses occurring in high-income 
countries (ODI and CDKN, 2014). The Overseas Development Institute and Climate 
Knowledge Development Network (2014) suggest that economic losses could reach 
over $400 billion a year by 2030. There is also increased recognition that climate 
change will exacerbate the occurrence of extreme weather events worldwide 




Effectively managing and reducing the risks of climate-related disasters is essential 
but not straightforward. Disaster risk management approaches have evolved 
significantly since the 1980s from a move away from top-down disaster relief and 
response measures towards a more comprehensive approach and a greater 
recognition of the importance of prevention, preparedness planning, training and 
recovery activities. Additionally, the last decade has seen an increasing focus on the 
notions of improving resilience to disasters and ‘building back better’. This is evident 
in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, which includes in its overarching 
goal the need to implement measures that “prevent and reduce hazard exposure and 
vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus 
strengthen resilience” (UNISDR, 2015). The Sendai Framework also indicates that 
building resilience into policies, plans, programmes and budgets is an urgent task and 
stresses the use of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction to ‘build back better’. It 
is also increasingly recognised that investing in disaster resilience can lead to what 
some have called a ‘triple dividend’, by avoiding losses, unlocking development 
potential and through the social, environmental and economic co-benefits of disaster 
risk management (ODI et al, 2015). 
 
The post-disaster recovery phase is particularly relevant to achieving advanced forms 
of disaster resilience that enables individuals and communities to better deal with 
disruptive change (Davidson et al., 2016). Yet, it is one of the least understood of all 
disaster phases (Berke et al., 1993; Jordan et al., 2016; Lawther, 2016; Rumbach et 
al., 2016). In particular, it has suffered from an initial focus on the physical 
reconstruction and restoration aspects of recovery, which resulted in a greater 
emphasis on hazard response, control and prediction rather than broader recovery 
(Tierney and Oliver-Smith, 2012). Many scholars argue that post-disaster recovery 
involves more than the reconstruction of the built environment and frame it as a 
dynamic and uneven political and social process (Berke et al., 1993; Nigg, 1995; 
Tierney and Oliver-Smith, 2012) where technological and social solutions need to be 
linked (Nakagawa, 2004) and political decision making processes and dynamics need 
to be taken into account (Hayward, 2013; Klein, 2007). In taking post-disaster recovery 
as a social process, scholars call for more attention to be paid to the social, political 
and economic contexts in which disasters occur instead of focusing on controlling the 
hazard itself (Nakagawa, 2004; Tompkins et al., 2008). Indeed, disaster recovery has 
suffered just like resilience from a depoliticised approach and a lack of attention to the 
governance and institutional processes and dynamics at local and national levels 
(Hayward, 2013). Nevertheless, despite increased understanding that disaster 
recovery also requires non-engineering solutions (International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2003), the focus on physical reconstruction to the 
detriment of social recovery is still in evidence today with, for example, the Sendai 
Framework predominantly setting priorities for response and reconstruction with no 
clear guidance for the social aspects of recovery (UNISDR, 2015). 
This paper aims to advance knowledge in disaster governance and recovery by 
examining the short and medium-term recovery of the Australian coastal town of 
Cardwell, Queensland, following the strike of tropical cyclone Yasi in 2011, with a 
particular focus on the social aspects of community recovery. We use Smith and 
Wenger’s (2006) definition of disaster recovery as ‘the differential process of restoring, 
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rebuilding and reshaping the physical, social, economic and natural environment 
through pre-event planning and post-event actions’. With its focus on the social 
component of the post-disaster recovery phase, the paper seeks to inform disaster 
recovery beyond the typical hazard reduction and physical reconstruction focus, and 
argues for the inclusion of improved guidance for the social aspects of disaster 
recovery as a part of the trajectory for disaster resilience (Norris et al., 2009). In doing 
so the paper does not ignore that much of the social implications that stem from 
disasters are also rooted in the broader social, political and economic context as well 
as historical processes  (Cutter, 2016; Finch et al., 2010; Klein and Smith, 2008). 
Hence, disaster recovery is essentially a social-political process and demands an 
holistic approach which links recovery structures concerning infrastructure, 
ecosystems, institutions, economics, and culture (Tierney and Oliver-Smith, 2012). 
Post-disaster recovery is essentially local and context dependent (Leonard and Howitt, 
2010). It is a complex social-political process whose successfulness is difficult to 
measure and predict, particularly when multiple physical, biophysical, social and 
political factors need be considered (Jordan et al., 2016). Hence, there is much to 
learn about the post-disaster recovery process, especially the social aspects of 
recovery, in order for it to be improved (Albright and Crow, 2015; Jordan and 
Javernick-Will, 2013; Olshansky et al., 2006; Tierney and Oliver-Smith, 2012). This 
paper contributes to this learning by offering empirically drawn lessons from Cardwell’s 
post-disaster recovery during the first two years following Yasi.  
 
2. Background 
2.1 Disaster governance in Australia  
Australia is particularly exposed to slow and rapid onset natural hazards leading to 
disasters given its climate, landscape and urban settlements characteristics 
(Department of Climate Change, 2009; Middelmann, 2007; Serrao-Neumann et al., 
2014). As a developed country with significant capacity to respond to natural hazards 
(Haddad, 2005; Reisinger et al., 2014), Australia has a long history in dealing with 
disasters that has informed many changes in disaster governance (Blanchi et al., 
2014). Disaster management arrangements in Australia have a cooperative character 
involving multiple levels of governments (federal, state and local) as well as non-
government organisations and a significant volunteer-based workforce (Council of 
Australian Governments, 2011). Arrangements have evolved significantly since the 
1980s from a strong focus on response towards a greater recognition of the 
importance of prevention, preparedness planning, training and recovery activities 
(Handmer et al., 1999). At the national level, the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) adopted in 2009 a whole-of-nation resilience-based approach to disaster 
management, which recognised the collective responsibility of all sectors of society in 
managing disasters. Further to this, the National Disaster Resilience Framework was 
developed at the end of 2009 and in February 2011 COAG adopted the National 
Strategy for Disaster Resilience (Council of Australian Governments, 2011).  
Operationally, the federal government does not have specific constitutional power in 
respect of emergency management and its main role is to support the development 
by the states and territories of a national emergency management capability, and to 
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provide national coordination and resources in cases of major national disasters. The 
primary responsibility for emergency management falls to the local and state 
governments, however, local governments have limited competencies and financial 
resources compared with state government agencies in all disaster phases (Melo 
Zurita et al., 2015). Additionally, key emergency response and recovery agencies with 
delegated responsibility for on-ground disaster response and recovery are also largely 
reliant on volunteers (i.e., rural fire brigade, state emergency services, Australian Red 
Cross) (McLennan et al., 2016). These agencies are traditionally responsible for 
disaster response and immediate recovery, but more recently there has been 
increased expectation for them to play a greater role in disaster preparedness and 
prevention along with local governments and communities (Melo Zurita et al., 2015).  
2.2 Disaster risk management approaches 
The current Australian disaster management system is based on the ‘comprehensive’, 
‘all hazards’ and ‘all agencies’ approach and, following an international trend, the focus 
on building back better and resilience has been particularly evident in both political 
and policy rhetoric (Aldunce et al., 2015; Leitch and Bohensky, 2014). The notion of 
‘building back better’, or ‘betterment’ as it is known in Australia, is included in key 
disaster management directives both at national and state levels. It is directly 
mentioned in the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery arrangements (“Betterment, in 
relation to an asset, means the restoration or replacement of the asset to a more 
disaster-resilient standard than its pre-disaster standard.” (Australian Government, 
2011); and indirectly in the National Principles for Disaster Recovery through the 
recognition that disaster recovery can provide an opportunity to improve physical, 
environmental, economic and psychosocial aspects beyond previous conditions 
(Community and Disability Services & Minister's Advisory Council, n.d.). At the state 
level, betterment is also defined in the Queensland Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
as the “process of building back disaster-damaged public infrastructure in a way that 
makes it more resilience to future natural disasters” (Queensland Government, 2014). 
What is common in all these references is the association of the concept of betterment 
with the built environment and infrastructure as opposed to its expanded interpretation 
to also seek opportunities to improve urban planning policies, social equity and 
economic development (Kates et al., 2006). 
In parallel, the resilience concept also permeates disaster management rhetoric and 
practice in Australia (McLennan et al., 2016). Priority disaster resilience initiatives are 
funded through the National Partnership Agreement on Natural Disaster Resilience 
(Council of Australian Governments, 2011). The Agreement recognises the role of 
multiple parties in disaster resilience as a collective responsibility, including all levels 
of government, business, the non-government sector and individuals. In particular, 
there is increased emphasis on community self-reliance as a key element of disaster 
resilience based on people’s ability to take more responsibility for themselves and 
decrease reliance on government services (Aldunce et al., 2015; Leadbeater, 2013). 
Yet, while individuals and communities are being asked to take greater responsibility, 
this has not necessarily been followed by a transfer of financial resources or the 
development of skills and capacities at the community and local levels (Leadbeater, 
2013; McLennan and Handmer, 2012). There is also much attention to disaster 
preparedness to enable better response and strengthen resilience (Leitch and 
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Bohensky, 2014) but understanding about other phases’ role in disaster resilience 
such as the recovery phase lags behind (Aldunce et al., 2015; Camilleri et al., 2009).  
3. Methods 
This paper examines the post-disaster recovery process of the town of Cardwell, 
located in Far North Queensland, Australia (Figure 1). Far North Queensland is a 
region affected by tropical cyclones on a yearly basis with an average of 4.7 cyclones 
per year and more than 207 known events since records began in 1858 (Australian 
Bureau of Meteorology, 2016). In early February 2011, category 4/5 Tropical Cyclone 
Yasi hit Cardwell with wind gusts of up to 285 km/h and a tidal surge of five metres. 
While the impact of the tidal surge was less intense than expected across the town, 
the intensity of the storm  destroyed homes and infrastructure in the urban area and 
caused substantial damage to key industries such as agriculture and tourism 
(Australian Bureau of  Meteorology, 2011). As a result, many members of the 
community suffered significant personal and financial hardships with insurance losses 
estimated at AUD$1.3 billion (Insurance Council of Australia, 2016; Regional Australia 




Figure 1. Cardwell location 
 
The analysis of Cardwell’s social recovery draws on empirical data collected over two 
rounds of semi-structured interviews with Cardwell residents. The first round involving 
eighteen interviews occurred between August and November 2011 (up to nine months 
following the disaster) and focused on immediate response and short-term recovery – 
as the effectiveness of initial post-disaster activities plays a critical role in the social 
recovery process (Tierney and Oliver-Smith, 2012). The second round totalling twenty 
two interviews occurred between January and February 2013 (two years after the 
disaster) and focused on investigating the recovery process two years after the 
cyclone. Interviewees were purposely selected (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009) based 
on their direct involvement through volunteerism with existing community-based 
groups operating in different sectors (e.g., commerce, environment, tourism, 
Indigenous, health etc.) at the time of the research. Due to interviewees’ availability, 
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only nine informants from the first round of interviews were also interviewed in the 
second round. A focus group meeting involving four people was held to validate 
information collected through the second round of interviews. Interviews lasted about 
one hour, were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Transcripts were analysed 
through in-depth content analysis (Bowen and Bowen, 2008) seeking evidence related 
to social recovery followed by coding using NVivo software.  
Despite the relatively small sample size of informants limiting the potential for 
generalisation of our findings, views expressed by the interviewees were also held by 
many in the wider Cardwell community. Indeed, the majority of informants were 
associated with community-based organisations and during the interviews they 
reported not only on their personal experiences and feelings but also on others’ 
experiences within their social networks. Additionally, many  informants also took part 
in a parallel action-research project (Reason and Bradbury, 2006) in the two years 
following the disaster aimed at preparing a strategic action plan seeking to improve 
their long-term recovery. The project comprised a series of seven full-day workshops 
with an average of 17 participants each, and two subsequent public meetings involving 
about 50-60 community members each that validated the future options included in 
the action plan.   
 
4. Cardwell’s social recovery: results and discussion 
Key findings can be drawn from interviews concerning Cardwell’s recovery with 
implications for future disaster management initiatives seeking to improve social 
recovery. Findings are particularly associated with the institutional and social elements 
of disaster governance, including the role of community members, volunteers and 
state actors in post-disaster social recovery. To set a context for these findings, a brief 
overview of the recovery process is presented next. 
4.1 Overview of the recovery process 
In the aftermath of the disaster, Cardwell was confronted with geographical isolation 
due to impacts on major infrastructure services such as roads, energy, water supply 
and treatment, and on food supply. Geographical isolation was not new for Cardwell 
residents as they often get cut off during the raining season when roads are flooded 
and access is limited. Based on this previous experience, residents are often prepared 
to become self-sufficient in terms of food and water supply and energy for several 
days. Similarly, many had full understanding about the preparation needed in the 
advent of a cyclone and prepared accordingly for Yasi. For many interviewees 
however it was the first time they experienced a disaster of the magnitude of Yasi and 
the implications for their recovery that followed.  
Cardwell residents relied on their existing social networks (e.g., neighbours, family and 
friends) to start their recovery process supported by their pre-disaster preparation and 
experience in dealing with disasters before official teams were able to reach the 
location. While communities and individuals are being increasingly asked to take 
greater responsibility in disaster management, including managing disaster risks to 
increase their resilience to disasters (Walker et al., 2010), they are not consulted or 
engaged in the disaster management process, which is led by governments. This 
discrepancy between those who make decisions regarding disaster planning and 
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management (governments) and those who suffer from the impacts of disasters and 
have to take the first immediate steps towards disaster recovery, often without much 
support, can have significant implications. Indeed, it can lead to not only tensions and 
disagreements between community members and government agencies in the 
recovery phase, but also to a feeling of powerlessness amongst individuals and a 
sense of loss of control over their own and the community’s problems. This was 
evident in Cardwell where there was disagreement between community members and 
officials as to how post-disaster risks were to be managed in the immediate recovery 
phase in a culture of risk adverse governments.  For example, physical access to 
damaged properties and impacted locations was denied to residents because of the 
identified risks they posed to citizens and working crews – the last predominantly 
composed by volunteers that were brought in, many from interstate and without 
knowledge of local conditions, to assist in the recovery. During this critical time, there 
were limited opportunities for local residents to convey their local knowledge to 
working crews to maximise their efficiency on-the-ground and many felt powerless 
because they could not continue to assist other residents that still required help despite 
their capacity and willingness to do so.  
From a social recovery perspective, a combination of both government and non-
government agencies personnel offered assistance to affected residents in terms of 
immediate financial relief prescribed by legislation as well as psychological support 
during the first few months following the disaster. Recovery efforts led by local and 
state government agencies then shifted away from this psychological and social 
support to concentrate on reconstructing damaged built structures (publicly and 
privately owned) in the short and mid-term. Notably, in the months that followed the 
disaster, existing and newly created community groups engaged in activities seeking 
to restore broader community normalcy (Serrao-Neumann et al., 2013a; Serrao-
Neumann et al., 2013b). In particular, there was significant effort to reverse the pre-
disaster economic stagnation of the town which was exacerbated by the disaster 
(Regional Australia Institute, 2013a, b) - as is often the case (Colten et al., 2008; 
Olshansky et al., 2006). Despite all reconstruction works and community efforts to 
speed up recovery, tropical cyclone Yasi inflicted long-lasting impacts on the Cardwell 
region, with many still suffering the consequences from significant damage five years 
later (Kim, 2016). This situation, to some extent, reflects the political dimension of 
disaster management which exacerbates disaster impacts as a result of reduced 
public funds spent on maintaining infrastructure and essential services provided by 
government agencies (Klein, 2007). For example, reconstruction works in the town 
and region brought a contingent of workers that inflated the rental market making it 
unaffordable to many local residents.  
4.2 Role of community members in post-disaster social recovery 
As outlined earlier, there is an increased focus on community self-reliance in disaster 
risk management literature and practice to promote greater disaster resilience 
(Aldunce et al., 2014; Aldunce et al., 2015; Manyena, 2006).  The concept of self-
reliance is often linked to some form of action non-state actors take to address disaster 
situations, especially in the preparedness phase (Manyena, 2006). At the individual/ 
household level, this may include preparing and executing disaster plans or acquiring 
insurance policies. However, there is less clarity as to how community self-reliance 
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plays out during the recovery phase; and the Cardwell example highlights the 
difficulties that communities face to implement aspects of self-reliance. The Cardwell 
community faced several barriers in the immediate recovery process, including, official 
on-the-ground procedures and mandates relating to disaster response and recovery 
as well as geographical isolation which led to institutional isolation. Indeed, the 
geographical isolation imposed by Tropical Cyclone Yasi on the Cardwell community 
meant that residents initiated their recovery process on their own without support from 
formal government structures as there were reports by interviewees that state actors 
(official authorities such as police and ambulance officers) left the town in anticipation 
of the cyclone to protect themselves and their families. This meant that there was no 
official line of communication between the community and authorities to report on the 
immediate post-disaster damage and situation. This setting concurs with the literature 
which identifies members of the community themselves as being the first responders 
in assisting disaster victims rather than official personnel (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015; 
Whittaker et al., 2015). Yet, this on-the-ground reality is not recognised within official 
disaster planning processes. 
As first responders, Cardwell residents relied on their existing pre-disaster personal 
and social networks. For example, there were references to how elements of 
community cohesion/ spirit were enhanced beyond people’s social networks despite 
the impact caused by the disaster as described below. 
No, I think it was – I think it just came out of seeing – when you actually 
look around and you see people with their houses and that.  I think it just 
– you know, you just go out and help wherever you can and whoever 
needed help. (i7, second round of interviews - to protect interviewee’s 
identity codes are used for all quotes) 
A pre-requisite for self-reliance in this case may include the nurturing of these 
networks in the pre-disaster phase, networks which can be re-enforced and/or 
expanded in the post-disaster phase (Marín et al., 2015; Whittaker et al., 2015). 
Notably, community self-reliance in the form of social networks may extend beyond 
the actual geographic location affected by the disaster during the recovery phase. An 
exemplar of this situation was the Indigenous rangers network programme established 
at the regional level which was instrumental in the recovery phase. 
I think it was just the desire to help their fellow Indigenous Australians in 
times of disaster.  They had the means to do it.  They had the desire to do 
it.  So they’ve done it.  They were compelled to come here.  Absolutely, 
from a cultural perspective, they were culturally compelled to come and 
help us out.  They had the means and they had the resources and they 
want to do it, so they came.  I think the relationship that was there between 
the ranger programmes in the past also supported that.”  (i14, second 
round of interviews) 
Additionally, community-led initiatives were influential in providing assistance and 
support to residents in the months that followed the disaster, including after the 
departure of government-led recovery services from the area. 
One of our members has started up a morning tea for anyone who wants 
to turn up, mainly women, and that's working well because they're all 
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starting to come out of the woodwork now.  They talk about it, and any 
problems they have, they natter about those. (i16, first round of interviews) 
Despite the above examples of how social cohesion and networks are important for 
social recovery, they have been underutilised and under-supported in formal, 
government pre-disaster planning and management (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015). As 
first responders, more attention needs to be paid to building communities’ skill sets to 
enhance their role in the recovery processes (Vallance and Carlton, 2015), thereby 
boosting self-reliance. Here, we concur with other scholars (Aldunce et al., 2015; 
Scolobig et al., 2015) that for self-reliance to be effective in practice the community 
needs to be better engaged in formal disaster management processes to determine 
not only their capacity to deal with disasters but also where this capacity requires 
improvement. This engagement also needs to be supported by legislative frameworks 
and willingness of authorities and citizens to collaborate in alternative ways (Scolobig 
et al., 2015). At present, despite the government rhetoric on building communities that 
are more resilient to disasters, funding for programs that actually contributed to this 
continue to be absent despite the occurrence of several severe disasters in Australia 
in recent years (McGowan, 2012). 
Furthermore, community-based disaster risk reduction has been identified as a key 
strategy towards resilience-focused approaches to disaster management (Aldunce et 
al., 2016; Lawther, 2016; McLennan et al., 2016). This type of strategy is underpinned 
by co-production of public policy predicated on community participation, ownership 
and capacity-building; thereby directly related to the notions of self-reliance and 
shared responsibility. Nonetheless, on-the-ground events in the Cardwell case pointed 
to the need for greater attention to promote this type of strategy during the recovery 
phase to avoid missing opportunities for building local capacity of existing community-
based groups.  
There’s opportunities that we lost in terms of how it was recorded from a 
local perspective.  Pulling that information together because, as I said 
before, there was lots and lots of meetings and people from outside were 
gathering information.  But we were in this whirlpool.  There was no 
opportunity for us to – because we were responding to everybody else so 
much, we didn’t have our feet on the ground long enough to be able to do 
our own thing.  I think, in retrospect, that there could’ve been a lot more 
done in terms of supporting those organisations, […], that are already here 
instead of bringing someone in from outside.  Giving them the resources 
to do things.  What ended up happening was the resources have gone to 
out of town. (fc, second round of interviews) 
As argued by scholars (Aldunce et al., 2016; Leonard and Howitt, 2010), every 
community recovery is unique and this uniqueness needs to be acknowledged as a 
source of experiences and knowledge about disasters. In the Cardwell case, many of 
the interviewees had a significant amount of both knowledge and experience about 
the uniqueness of their community with respect to addressing disasters, especially in 
the preparation and response phases. Notably, they were (and still are) learning 
about their recovery but no formal structures were/are in place to harness this 
learning and, more importantly, translate it to inform how future disasters are to be 
managed locally through relevant disaster management plans. While government 
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policy is pushing for a transfer of responsibility to communities, this has not been 
supported with a transfer of rights and resources (including financial ones), nor with 
efforts to enhance communities’ skills and capabilities (Aldunce et al., 2015). 
 
4.3 Role of volunteers in post-disaster social recovery 
While disaster management in Australia is primarily the responsibility of government 
agencies, on-the-ground activities, especially during the response and long-term 
recovery phases, are largely carried out by volunteers (McLennan et al., 2016; Melo 
Zurita et al., 2015; Whittaker et al., 2015). This may include ‘formal’ volunteers who 
are part of an emergency services workforce from which they receive special training, 
are activated upon authorities’ request, and therefore act in accordance to set 
procedures and regulations (Whittaker et al., 2015). Despite the large number of 
volunteers associated with Australian emergency services (McLennan et al., 2016), 
response to large scale or widespread disasters can challenge their capacity to 
provide services (Walker et al., 2010), hence the increased focus on promoting 
community self-reliance and shared responsibility.  For example, Yasi occurred at the 
tail end of a major flood event that affected the whole State of Queensland (The World 
Bank and Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2011), stretching emergency 
management personnel - mostly composed of volunteers- to the limit.  Given the 
severity and extent of the hazards the assistance provided to the affected community 
was presented with several shortfalls. In particular, many informants highlighted how 
inadequate skill sets compounded by workplace, health and safety regulations limited 
their ability to assist affected residents as reported below. 
Maybe our expectation was too high but you just were of the opinion that 
the State Emergency people would be well equipped and trained to handle 
the disaster and what needed to be done.  It's not that the will of the 
individuals wasn't there, but I found that a lot of them had no training or 
experience whatsoever in helping in things like tarping down people's 
houses, operating chainsaws to clear away debris off people's properties 
and then to have access to their properties. (i6, first round of interviews) 
McLennan et al. (2016) raise two issues related to how the nature of volunteering is 
changing in modern times and the implications for the disaster management sector. 
On the one hand, greater engagement of volunteers in disaster management might 
include greater community engagement, capacity-building and participation in disaster 
governance. On the other hand, it represents a reduction in government’s 
responsibility in delivering services as a result of a neoliberal agenda (Cretney, 2014; 
Welsh, 2014). Either way, the situation is increasing pressure on volunteers to fulfil 
tasks once performed by government personnel and also doesn’t deal with the 
community expectations about the quality of services provided (Eburn and Dovers, 
2015) as observed in the Cardwell example. This pressure is in addition to increased 
regulation and bureaucracy relevant to volunteerism in the disaster management 
sector (McLennan et al., 2016). Although informants criticised the inflexibility of 
government agencies centred on risk adverse policies, local Indigenous rangers 
skilled in emergency management procedures were able to carry on with on-the-
ground recovery works. 
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There was coordination, some coordination amongst our own ranger 
programmes.  Our ranger coordinator led that – in partnership, of course, 
with the other coordinators.  They’d sit down and work out where each 
unit was going to go and what they needed and so forth.’ (i14, second 
round of interviews) 
Additionally, better interaction between volunteer-based recovery agencies and the 
community could also harness existing local knowledge and benefit from personal 
networks to improve the quality of services provided. 
I was there very early and everyone was coming up talking to me, and I 
sort of knew everyone's individual circumstances.  Then as the teams 
were setting up I was sort of helping them with the people go through.  
And then someone – it was actually someone from Red Cross sort of 
came in and said, like, I had to move along it wasn't my job to do that.  But 
they didn't understand the individual circumstances of what was going on.  
And they sort of treated everyone like a number.  And I could see the 
whole crowd was getting really quite agitated with that.  There was a 
depersonalisation happening.  So I think that there really has to be a local 
component.  I mean, it's great what the community recovery and all of 
those organisations do, but there needs to be a local component within 
that. (i11, first round of interviews) 
Support for residents during the months and years that follow a disaster is often not 
the subject of attention of disaster risk management efforts (Walker et al., 2010). 
Affected residents that do not have the skills and knowledge to deal with reconstruction 
works (including insurers and tradespeople to rebuild their houses) may be left with 
no support and need to rely on their social networks to make decisions or get 
assistance (Walker et al., 2010). The examples discussed here point to caveats in 
social recovery activities deployed by authorities in charge of disaster recovery. 
Importantly, there needs to be clarity about the roles of different actors in disaster 
management, especially when shared responsibility is at stake (Melo Zurita et al., 
2015). For example, non-government organisations, largely composed by volunteers, 
are generally responsible for implementing disaster recovery operations, and their 
contribution to disaster management is likely to increase under climate change 
(Whittaker et al., 2015). Nonetheless, this contingent of volunteers is not always 
welcome by authorities due to issues related to public liability (Whittaker et al., 2015). 
Hence, while there is rhetoric towards community self-reliance for improved disaster 
resilience, formal institutional structures are unprepared to roll this out in practice. As 
observed in the Cardwell case, the rhetoric/discourse of community self-reliance and 
responsibility is at odds with existing regulatory frameworks and inherent procedures 
relating to disaster management. Consequently, when it comes to implementation, 
disaster management is still led by the usual players: government agencies with 
support from usual non-government organisations and their volunteers, with no 




4.4 Role of state actors in post-disaster social recovery 
Literature notes that a critical challenge for post-disaster recovery is to achieve a 
balance between quick return to normalcy whilst taking the opportunity to improve pre-
disaster conditions (Glavovic and Smith, 2014; Olshansky et al., 2012). Often, time 
constraint impedes wider engagement of the community and re-enforces the 
command and control approach deployed to post-disaster recovery by state actors. 
This trend was confirmed in the post-Yasi case with many criticising the poor 
engagement of the community in decision-making involving reconstruction works. In 
particular, interviewees stressed how limited community engagement occurred to 
determine the location of cyclone shelters throughout the region as well as the 
rebuilding of the major highway that traverses the town. 
I think that should have been handled a hell of a lot better.  It was just, 
again decisions that are taken on behalf of local communities or small 
communities without consulting the communities first. (i13, second round 
of interviews) 
The above example also illustrates how the lack of flexibility in disaster governance 
and institutional arrangements result in post-disaster assistance that does not address 
variation in local needs (Glavovic and Smith, 2014). The lack of community 
engagement during the post-disaster phase also highlighted the conflicts between 
priorities perceived by the community and those set by government authorities. The 
government’s traditional focus on infrastructure remains strong despite growing 
rhetoric/discourse around betterment and disaster resilience. As exemplified by the 
below quote from a Cardwell resident, government agencies still primarily focus on 
physical reconstruction rather than social recovery. 
All I see is all this focus on this highway, there is no money for anything in 
Cardwell apart from restoring emergency services; there's been no money 
spent basically on anything except this highway plan. So it looks like all 
the money is just going to be spent basically on main roads. (i7, first round 
of interviews) 
Despite the trend related to betterment in disaster risk reduction in Australia involving 
infrastructure projects during the post-disaster recovery phase, this has not happened 
in practice and opportunities to change regulations have been missed (McGowan, 
2012). This situation reflects an international trend in which pre-disaster planning to 
speed up recovery from natural hazards is neglected despite its recognised 
importance, including the role of high-quality community-based leadership and 
institutional capacity (Leonard and Howitt, 2010).  
When investigating the role of state actors in the Cardwell recovery process, we noted 
that it was in line with the traditional approach to disaster management reported in the 
literature (Aldunce et al., 2014; Aldunce et al., 2015) - that is, government agencies 
and practitioners played a central role in implementing recovery activities with limited 
engagement of the community in decisions. Notably, large scale interventions without 
the necessary community engagement may in fact compromise communities’ social 
recovery from disasters because they rely on exogenous resources and inputs and 
reduce the community’s internal capacity (Lawther, 2016). 
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Clearly, there is a direct relationship between self-reliance and shared responsibility 
and engagement of affected communities in decisions regarding disaster risk 
management and recovery planning to achieve future resilience (Johnston et al., 
2012). This challenges the traditional approach to disaster management because it 
requires co-production of services during the recovery phase through collaboration 
between authorities, volunteers and community members to improve their ability to 
recover (Vallance, 2015) and become more resilient to disasters (Lorenz, 2013). As 
noted by (Vallance, 2015)) public participation in the recovery phase can be 
associated with recovery activities addressing substantial issues (e.g., clean ups, 
promoting social gathering) and/or procedural issues related to decision-making for 
recovery (e.g., how to go about the recovery). The Cardwell case illustrates that even 
the first form of participation was not fully supported by authorities once officials 
reached the location. The second form of participation leading to ‘co-production’ was 
totally absent. This situation indicates that the concept of self-reliance and shared 
responsibility adopted and promoted by authorities are short-lived in the recovery 
phase and not advanced beyond rhetoric.  
Thus, we concur with Vallance and Carlton (2015) that social recovery also implies 
harnessing the ‘participative capacity’ of the community, especially if disaster 
resilience is the ultimate goal of the recovery phase. In particular, the Cardwell case 
provides evidence that the absence of co-production of solutions (e.g., lack of 
community input in the reconstruction of the highway) represents a missed opportunity 
to build them back better as well as a hindrance to any form of partnership between 
state actors and community members in support of self-reliance and shared 
responsibility. We acknowledge that community engagement in decision-making is not 
a straightforward process with its own challenges and criticisms (Ostrom, 2000). 
However, in light of the increased rhetoric of community self-reliance and shared 
responsibility in disaster management, dismissing the participative capacity of the 
community in the process serves to retain the status-quo approach to disaster 
management.   
 
5. Conclusions 
In analysing the social recovery process of Cardwell post Yasi, empirically grounded 
lessons can be drawn with implications for disaster governance and policy 
implementation for disaster risk management. At the core of these lessons is the 
concept of self-reliance and shared responsibility and how to operationalize them in 
practice and, more importantly, during the post-disaster phase.  
Firstly, the study showed evidence of community self-reliance in the immediate 
recovery phase largely based on residents’ personal experience in preparing for and 
dealing with disasters as well as existing social networks. To increase community’s 
resilience to disaster, efforts to operationalize self-reliance also need to consider the 
extended recovery phase.  This might entail long-term and continual support for 
building social networks during the post-disaster phase extending beyond the 
immediate recovery phase/timescale. In an age of greater mobility and access to 
information and communication technologies, social networks need to be considered 
beyond traditional spatial boundaries as exemplified by the role played by the 
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Indigenous ranger network programme. Importantly, these networks are likely to 
contribute to disseminate much needed locally based knowledge and experience 
concerning disaster preparedness as well as recovery; therefore fostering social 
recovery in the context of the uniqueness of each community. Programmes supporting 
the strengthening of these social networks may also contribute to building disaster 
resilience associated with the consolidation of social learning based on experiential 
learning as observed by Aldunce et al.’s (2015) study. 
Secondly, operationalizing self-reliance in the recovery phase requires alternative 
ways of collaboration between different actors engaged in the recovery process - that 
is, community members, volunteers and state actors. In particular, our study showed 
the tension between residents and volunteers deployed by current institutional and 
disaster governance arrangements to assist in the community recovery. Reports 
indicated that this tension, to some extent, undermined self-reliance. It also confirmed 
the confusion about roles and responsibilities at times when decisions and actions 
need to occur quickly, and how simple prescriptive delegation by governments of 
responsibility to community members is flawed. Notably, there was little scope for 
‘spontaneous’ volunteers within the community to assist ‘formal’ volunteers, especially 
through sharing their local knowledge about the locality and its people.  This situation 
calls for greater engagement of communities in pre-disaster planning and risk 
management processes as well as greater communication between communities and 
government agencies responsible for disaster response and recovery. The 
involvement of communities in pre-disaster planning can then facilitate the 
establishment of credible and trustworthy lines of communication in the post-disaster 
phase. Improved communication would have the double benefit of: (i) informing 
‘formal’ volunteers of the uniqueness of the place, and (ii) empowering ‘spontaneous’ 
volunteers to continue to help their community.  
Thirdly, the previous two lessons challenge the traditional approach to disaster risk 
management which still dominates aspects of the practice in the recovery phase. They 
do so because they call for greater public engagement in pre-disaster planning as well 
as post-disaster recovery to support social recovery.  Overall, the Cardwell example 
shows that self-reliance in the recovery phase works well when it concerns substantial 
issues (e.g., clean up) but lacks acceptance in procedural issues associated with 
decision-making. This is despite the abundant references to the important role of 
community engagement in building disaster resilience in the literature and government 
rhetoric. Self-reliance cannot be implemented without greater community engagement 
in their own post-disaster recovery. This would allow communities to present their 
priorities for recovery instead of having the government imposing its own priorities. 
The Cardwell example clearly highlights the divergence in those priorities with the 
government’s strong emphasis on physical reconstruction with funds predominantly 
allocated to the redevelopment of the highway. A two-way conversation between 
community and government is needed to ensure that recovery priorities are better 
aligned to communities’ needs and do not undermine their recovery capacity (e.g., 
increase in local rental prices). As suggested by Wilson’s (2009) observations about 
the New Orleans’ recovery process, an effective community engagement strategy, 
which produces this two-way conversation and defines community goals, needs and 
aspirations from disaster recovery, is as important as an investment strategy for 
disaster recovery to be fully accomplished. Such engagement strategy also needs to 
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deal with issues associated with ‘spontaneous’ volunteering emerging from community 
members and opportunities for communication lines to eventuate and enable 
conveyance of local knowledge to both ‘formal’ volunteers and state actors.  
Lastly, in times of increased threat from climate change impacts, these lessons call for 
anticipated planning for disaster recovery to ensure shared responsibility is in fact 
equally shared amongst the different actors. Engaging communities in disaster 
recovery is not an untroubled or apolitical process. It requires substantial investment 
of resources and time to deal with the intricacies of engagement per se (e.g., difficulty 
in mobilising interest, achieving agreed outcomes), rigid local and national policies and 
bureaucracies (e.g. unwillingness to devolve power to communities, short-term 
timeframes for disaster recovery), and macro-political decisions that undermine 
ongoing delivery and maintenance of public services and infrastructure. Nonetheless, 
proactive and reflexive approaches to disaster governance could harness the 
opportunity of the current post-disaster phase to seek to mitigate existing negative 
trends as well as foresee their potential impacts on future community recovery 
processes. They also could contribute to enact policy and structural reforms related to 
disaster management activities for both disaster and non-disaster times, especially to 
clarify roles and responsibilities of the many actors involved in disaster management. 
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